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 In this introduction, we underline the theoretical connection between responsibility, luck, 
and equality upon which luck egalitarianism rests, and we consider the social and 
political relevance of the approach. We then situate Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s version 
of the view as proposed in his book, Luck Egalitarianism, in the egalitarian landscape. 
Lastly, we introduce the six papers that make up this symposium: some are critiques from 
within or outside luck egalitarianism, while others engage with the theory by expanding 
the scope of luck egalitarianism. 
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Inequalities and Individual Responsibility 
Imagine two people, Abel and Beth. Abel’s health is deteriorating, he has few friends, and he is 
struggling financially. Beth, on the other hand, is in excellent shape - health wise, socially, and 
financially. Abel’s life, in other words, is pretty miserable whereas Beth leads a fully flourishing 
life. It is not hard for any of us to imagine people like Abel or Beth. Some of us seem to be living 
safe and fulfilling lives while others struggle in one or more important respects. Now imagine 
that all we knew about our two hypothetical persons – and about the people they represent and 
remind us of – is that they are living lives of unequal quality. Would we be in a position to 
describe this situation as unjust? 
Some would say that we already know enough to make this judgment: the mere fact that 
Abel’s life is miserable when Beth is thriving makes this state of affairs unjust – full stop. One 
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reason for this could be egalitarian: Abel and Beth are faced with very unequal health, financial 
and wellbeing outcomes. Many others would hesitate. Perhaps we simply do not have enough 
information to assess this situation as unjust? Perhaps we need to know more about the ways in 
which this situation came about. What, for example, if we learned that Abel was a heavy smoker, 
despite being fully informed about the risks associated with smoking, and that this had caused his 
bad health? (Albertsen 2016) What if we knew that he was a lousy friend and spent his money 
imprudently? What if, in other words, we found out that Abel was in large part responsible for 
his relative disadvantage? Would we then still have to consider the inequality between the two 
unjust? 
Individual responsibility is a recurring theme in modern politics. It would be difficult to 
find a political discussion on how resources such as income support and health care should be 
distributed that does not invoke some notion of individual responsibility. For example, it is often 
thought that the question of whether unemployed citizens are entitled to social benefits depends 
on how responsible they are for their joblessness. There is also the widespread view that those 
who indulge in risky behaviours such as smoking, drinking or eating junk food should be made 
to bear the costs of their bad choices. Since most societies believe that individuals are in part 
responsible for the choices they make, they also think that it makes sense to expect them to bear 
the burdens of those choices. The reverse is also true: we judge those who make virtuous, wise 
and prudent choices as being entitled to the gains that their conduct brings; or at least we often 
contend that they should not have to pay for the imprudence of others. 
These kinds of considerations lead to concrete policy proposals like differential health 
insurance for those severely overweight or for smokers, or making welfare benefits for the 
unemployed conditional on their willingness to prove that they are actively looking for a job. But 
the implications of this attention to individual responsibility are even wider: the political focus 
on responsibility invites a constant conversation about whether those that are worst-off are 
themselves to blame. The focus on the individual contributions the worse off have made to their 
own disadvantage often serves to limit the permissibility of redistribution from the wealthy to the 
worse-off. On this view, those who have less are often seen as underserving of assistance; they 
should just have made better choices. Of course, there is also the possibility for undeserving rich 
and deserving poor within this paradigm. But in political discourse, the distrust of the poor is far 
more widespread than that of the wealthy. And once we are trained to see individual 
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responsibility as being of primary importance, we develop a tendency to design the provision of 
social benefits in a way that filters out those who are undeserving. In other words, we become 
used to greeting poverty with suspicion. 
The value of individual responsibility, therefore, sometimes conflicts with another 
important political value: equality of outcome. We commonly hold people individually 
responsible to justify denying them the resources and benefits that they would need to be better 
off. Denying unemployment benefits or income support to an applicant because she has refused a 
job, for instance, is likely to leave her much worse off than her (employed) co-citizens. 
Similarly, appealing to individual responsibility to deny someone an expensive cancer treatment 
will leave that person much worse-off than they would be with access to treatment or than 
someone without cancer. 
Because of this, insofar as we take equality to be of great value, we might be tempted to 
take individual responsibility with a pinch of salt, or perhaps even to disregard it entirely. We 
may object that the scrutinizing processes needed for finding out who is responsible are 
impermissible (Anderson 1999, Wolff 1998), or epistemically challenging, or that people are 
barely ever individually responsible for their social position anyway.  
In turn, many are likely to worry that displacing the individual responsibility paradigm 
entirely is unrealistic and unappealing. It is unrealistic because we live in a society where 
individual responsibility is so pervasive. It is unappealing because individual responsibility has 
intuitive moral traction. After all, insofar as individual responsibility is tied to our agency as free 
and autonomous beings, it does deserve to play a prominent role in any plausible conception of 
social justice. Rather than throwing the baby out with the bathwater, therefore, a more promising 
strategy may be to provide an egalitarian account of responsibility – a theory that articulates the 
two notions and provides a frame, as well as limits, for a just tracking of responsibility in an 
egalitarian society. Elaborating on the interconnections between these values and on how to 
resolve the potential tensions thus holds great potential for informing political debates. 
 
Luck Egalitarianism 
Luck egalitarianism is one of the most prominent theoretical answers to how these values can be 
reconciled. It aims to re-appropriate responsibility for political progressives. For luck egalitarian 
theorists, it is unfair if people are worse-off than others through no fault of their own (through 
4 
 
bad luck). They believe that responsibility is central to justice, but that the circumstances under 
which people can be held responsible for their choices are restricted. For example, if we modify 
the background facts of our introductory example so that the reason Abel is doing much less well 
than Beth is that he faced much greater obstacles and had fewer opportunities to flourish, a luck 
egalitarian would be able to complain that the inequality is unjust.  
An important condition for holding people responsible is whether there is a fair 
background distribution. If people’s starting shares are unfairly small - if they face greater 
obstacles than others - it is not their fault (or at least not fully) if they should end up with less 
than those who are comparatively advantaged. So, holding people from disadvantaged 
backgrounds responsible for the fact that they do not – unlike those from privileged groups – 
have a university education, do not follow healthy diets, or do not have a savings account are 
examples of inappropriately holding people responsible: the fact that they are worse off than 
others is to a very large extent due to brute bad luck. Many of the things for which people are 
being held responsible in political discourses today - unemployment, poverty, smoking, etc. - are 
therefore not in line with luck egalitarian ideas: only when people are worse off through their 
own fault can they can claim fewer of society’s benefits. 
This symposium offers a critical discussion of luck egalitarian justice, taking Kasper 
Lippert-Rasmussen’s Luck Egalitarianism (2015) as a starting point. Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
influential book offers a new, stimulating and innovative account that builds on four decades of 
egalitarian political philosophy (especially in the writings of Arneson, Cohen, Dworkin, and 
Rawls), and develops his own view of what we owe each other as a matter of justice. 
Responsibility-sensitiveness and, in particular, the luck egalitarian idea that it is unjust 
when people’s chances in life are determined by factors outside of their control, have been a 
central part of contemporary political philosophy for more than three decades. Theorists that give 
this idea a central place in their views include John Rawls (1971), Ronald Dworkin (2000), 
Richard Arneson (1989), John Roemer (1996), and G.A. Cohen (2008). Yet, a theory that takes 
the luck egalitarian claim as central to justice had so far not been coherently brought together in 
an explicitly luck-egalitarian, theoretical framework. With the publication of Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen’s book, this has changed. Lippert-Rasmussen’s is a major figure in the contemporary 
debate on distributive justice and his book is in many ways the intellectual heir to the theories of 
the philosopher who most staunchly defended the luck egalitarian framework, G.A. Cohen 
5 
 
(2008).
2
 The book is a reference point both for its role as one of the first major books specifically 
dedicated to this topic and as a novel and thought-provoking account of responsibility-sensitive 
justice. 
Starting from the basic luck egalitarian premise that it is unjust if someone is worse off 
than others through their bad luck, Lippert-Rasmussen elaborates on the central concepts 
underlying this key statement; what does it mean to be equal and why does it matter? What is 
luck and when is someone responsible? When may someone be said to be worse off than others? 
In doing so, Lippert-Rasmussen distinguishes carefully between different values and reasons 
underlying luck egalitarian justice and elaborates on how existing accounts rely on these values. 
He also pays special attention to how those values differ and proposes a version of luck 
egalitarianism he believes captures better what is at stake than competing versions of the view. In 
this special issue, we collect a number of comments and critiques of this important and 
politically salient project. 
The contributions to this volume approach Lippert-Rasmussen’s luck egalitarianism from 
a variety of theoretical perspectives, but they each engage more generally with the Luck 
Egalitarian view in roughly three different ways: from within, from without and, from the inside-
out by expanding the scope of luck egalitarianism. 
 
Luck Egalitarianism from Within 
Some of the contributors of this collection are sympathetic to Luck Egalitarianism, and see their 
disagreements with Lippert-Rasmussen as a family dispute within responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarian theories. These contributors identify and discuss the building blocks of luck-
egalitarianism as well as its theoretical origins. One question concerns the theoretical authorities 
by which luck egalitarianism claims to be able to justify its foundational ideas concerning 
fairness and neutralizing the impact of (bad) luck. In “Justice as Fairness and Bad Luck,” Robert 
van der Veen asks whether we can count Rawls’ account of justice, properly understood, as 
offering support for the kind of luck egalitarianism Lippert-Rasmussen defends. He denies this, 
and claims that Rawls (1971) offers a different – more rich and compelling – view of the place of 
responsibility in distributive justice. On this view, inequalities that result from differences in luck 
can be justified if they are to the advantage of the worst off. 
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  In “How generous should egalitarians be?” Zofia Stemplowska examines the merits and 
limitations of Lippert-Rasmussen’s focus on equality of concern, comparing it to other plausible 
currencies of equality: resources and welfare. Her interest, in other words, is with what we 
should aim to equalize in order to attain an ideally just society. She welcomes Lippert-
Rasmussen’s currency, claiming that including a broader array of concerns compared to 
Dworkin’s (2000) equality of resources does better in capturing what we can reasonably demand 
of each other. Lippert-Rasmussen’s view, however, is too generous when it comes to the level of 
redistribution; that is, the compensation people should receive for shortfalls due to bad luck. In 
this case, Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance market provides a more appealing reply. 
Stemplowska shows how the two accounts can be combined to form a stronger answer to the 
question of what a just society should seek to equalize. 
 
Luck Egalitarianism from the Inside-out 
The contributions in this section each highlight an important set of implications of Lippert-
Rasmussen’s version of luck egalitarianism when expanding its scope. Axel Gosseries identifies 
and problematizes challenges that arise when applying this framework to political questions that 
go beyond currently living individuals. In “Are inequalities between us and the dead 
intergenerationally unjust?”, he discusses some implications of the view for intergenerational 
justice, and in particular for what - if anything - we owe to past generations. More specifically, 
Gosseries considers the question of whether inequalities between current generations and those 
that are already dead may be unjust - and, if so, what (if anything) we ought to do about it. 
Gosseries expands on Lippert-Rasmussen’s account and adds complexities to how inequalities 
between current and past generations may be unjust and what to do about it. 
In “On Who Matters: Extending the scope of Luck Egalitarianism to Groups,” Sara 
Amighetti and Siba Harb take issue with Lippert-Rasmussen’s exclusive focus on individuals at 
the expense of groups. More specifically, they think that Lippert-Rasmussen fails to recognize 
the significance of collective goods, and that including this notion in one’s distributive view 
provides good reasons to think that groups should be included in its scope. Further, Amighetti 
and Harb seek to nuance Lippert-Rasmussen’s view of how individuals may become responsible 
for group choices via the notion of corporate choice. They argue that luck egalitarianism is best 
formulated in a way that includes a concern with groups and not individuals exclusively. 
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Luck Egalitarianism from the Outside 
The contributors in this last section take a wider perspective on luck egalitarianism by taking 
issue with its core elements from an external perspective. Broadly speaking, they discuss 
whether it is the right kind of theory for our world. In “Equality, Value Pluralism and Relevance: 
Is Luck Egalitarianism in One Way Good, But Not All Things Considered?,” Tim Meijers and 
Pierre-Etienne Vandamme criticize the indeterminacy of Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s pluralist 
account, arguing that its inability to offer the appropriate form of action-guiding advice to 
political agents makes it practically inadequate. They suggest that Lippert-Rasmussen outlines 
some “rules of regulation” to help political agents resolve clashes between different important 
values such as justice, freedom, and community. Alternatively, they propose, one might 
elaborate on Lippert-Rasmussen’s own basis for moral equality - people’s capacity to be non-
instrumentally concerned with things - and use this as the fundamental value by which to 
adjudicate between other values when they conflict. 
  In “Unequally Egalitarian: Defending the Egalitarian Credentials of Social 
Egalitarianism,” David V. Axelsen and Juliana Bidadanure take issue with Luck Egalitarianism’s 
(over)emphasis on individual responsibility. They argue that Lippert-Rasmussen’s attempt to 
capture and subsume the content of the primary egalitarian rival, social egalitarianism, within his 
version of luck egalitarianism ultimately fails. While Lippert-Rasmussen does offer a version of 
luck egalitarianism that seems to avoid some of the main lines of criticism, the authors argue that 
he mischaracterizes parts of both the form and the content of the disagreement, and thus 
ultimately misses the mark. The authors provide a substantive, a methodological and a political 
defence of social egalitarianism by elaborating on this mischaracterization.  
  The value of responsibility is crucial to questions of distributive justice. This is true 
theoretically, when thinking about what form the right kind of theory of justice should take; and, 
as the contributions to this volume show, it also matters for political practice. We need to think 
about the proper place of responsibility – if there is a place for it – when thinking about the right 
way to design public policies. Luck Egalitarianism offers a powerful view on this, hence the 
question of whether and to what extend we should endorse it (and in what form) is crucial for 
theories of social justice. 
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 All authors of this introduction and editors of this special issue have contributed equally to the process, and are 
listed in alphabetical order here and on the cover.   
2
 However, as is clear in the expensive tastes debate (Cohen 2004), Cohen believed that far fewer actions and 
preferences are of the kind people could be held responsible for than other Luck Egalitarians like Dworkin (2000); 
responsibility, it seems, plays a bigger role in the distribution of goods in Dworkin’s theory. 
